For now, the options for ending the war appear to be Putin’s death or direct intervention by China to stop it.
The United States could also stop the war by imposing extremely tough sanctions on Russia’s tanker fleet and increasing pressure on Moscow, but it is currently pursuing the path of negotiations.
The coming period is likely to bring an escalation of the war, intensified strikes, ultimatums from Russia, and possible mobilization.Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en)Against the backdrop of escalation, various predictions are emerging about possible future scenarios in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Many have tried to find hints of an end to the war in the texts from the SCO summit in Bishkek. Unfortunately, I do not share even cautious optimism about a change in Russian policy.
Putin’s press conference in Bishkek on September 1 demonstrated his intention to escalate. He rejected the idea of freezing the conflict along the line of contact, saying that Russia does not need a “frozen conflict” but a “lasting, absolute peace.” Nebenzya at the UN, in turn, once again repeated Russia’s long-standing conditions for such peace,” which effectively amount to Ukraine’s capitulation.
The main reason is simple: Putin cannot stop this war because his regime depends on it. But since there has been no major result on the ground, Moscow is trying to achieve one by other means. At the same press conference, Putin spoke about preparations for massive strikes on Ukraine’s energy sector, the continuation of the campaign at sea, and effectively did not rule out expanding the geography of strikes against military infrastructure beyond Ukraine.
So this autumn, Russia will focus on Ukraine’s energy sector and economy. This campaign has already begun: strikes on Odesa region, energy facilities, ports, and logistics show that Moscow is shifting from isolated attacks to systematic, continuous pressure.
Politically, Bishkek gave Putin tolerance. Yes, Modi called for an end to the endless war, Tokayev spoke of freezing it along the front line, and China repeated its calls for dialogue, but none of these positions was backed by real pressure on Moscow. Russia was not condemned in the final document, maintained all of its bilateral contacts, and demonstrated that it had not been isolated.
For the Kremlin, this matters more than the words of its partners themselves. Diplomatic discomfort without an economic or political cost does not change Putin’s calculations. If partners talk about peace while continuing to trade, meet, and maintain normal relations, this creates no incentive to end the aggression.
Russia’s return to full participation in the G20 financial track sent Putin an even stronger signal. Together, Bishkek and the G20 lower Moscow’s perceived cost of continuing the war. Non-Western states are not punishing Russia for its behavior, while Western isolation is beginning to erode even before the war is over. For Putin, this means he can continue applying pressure while simultaneously returning to major international formats.
Within this framework, China is giving Russia a supportive shoulder. The most accurate way to describe China’s role is this: it absorbs part of Russia’s war costs. China buys Russian energy, maintains vital trade and technology channels, and thereby weakens the impact of Western pressure. Of course, China uses the situation to its own advantage and does not give Moscow everything it wants: Power of Siberia 2 still has not become operational.
China’s interest lies not in the war itself, but in its consequences for the global balance. A prolonged confrontation between Russia and the West diverts American and European resources, increases Moscow’s dependence on Beijing, and accelerates the fragmentation of the international order into several separate centers.
U.S. policy gives Putin additional incentives to raise the stakes: if the Trump administration needs a result before the November 3 midterm elections, it is in the Kremlin’s interest to weaken Ukraine’s position as much as possible before then.
A critical domestic date for the Kremlin is September 18-20. Until the State Duma elections, there is at least a formal political constraint on unpopular decisions; afterward, that constraint weakens. That is why after September 20 it will be important to monitor not only the possibility of a mobilization decree, but also a sharp increase in contract recruitment, regional payments, the use of reservists, and other ways of rapidly expanding manpower.
October appears to be the key month for intensifying Russian pressure. The heating season begins, Ukraine enters a period of maximum strain on its energy system, and Russia has time to stockpile missiles and drones and launch a campaign ahead of the U.S. elections.
The most likely scenario is a sharp intensification of the air and energy campaign. The main targets could include power generation, substations, gas infrastructure, transport hubs, the Odesa port complex, and the Danube route.
On the ground, pressure will most likely continue without a major breakthrough. Russia does not necessarily need a major breakthrough if it can maintain the impression that Ukraine’s position is slowly deteriorating.
October will also be the key month for negotiating pressure. If the Trump administration genuinely wants to show a result before November 3, this is when Washington will have the strongest incentive to seek at least a partial agreement. For Moscow, this means the opposite: raising the stakes as much as possible before U.S. pressure for a deal reaches its peak.
November will be the time when Russia tries to politically exploit whatever it manages to accumulate in September and October. If strikes on energy, logistics, and pressure at the front produce a tangible effect, Moscow will try to use it in negotiations.
November will also be important for Washington. The Trump administration needs a result before the elections, while it is in Putin’s interest to approach that date from the strongest possible position. Afterward, U.S. incentives could change quickly: Washington may either try to consolidate whatever agreement has been reached, or interest in a quick result may wane.
Thus, unfortunately, my prediction for October-November remains one of escalation. A genuine slowdown by Russia this autumn appears unlikely. For that to happen, at least one fundamental parameter would have to change: the battlefield situation for Russia would have to deteriorate sharply, economic instability would have to increase significantly, Ukraine’s air defense and long-range strike capabilities would have to grow substantially, or real pressure would have to emerge from China or the United States. So far, none of these factors has changed enough.
The main trend, therefore, is this: Putin is not moving toward peace; he is preparing to improve the terms of a future bargain. Bishkek showed him the absence of an international cost, the G20 showed the beginning of an erosion of Western isolation, China showed support, and the U.S. election calendar provided a concrete horizon by which to raise the stakes.— https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/2095217680764539274